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10.1 Introduction
Good health is by itself of great value. It enhances market earnings by
increasing the number of healthy days an individual has available for work
(Grossman 1972) and increases nonmarket productivity, allowing more
time for household production (Becker 1976). Health checkups help to se-
cure and maintain good health. However, the 1995 National Survey of Life
(Kokumin Seikatsu Kiso Chosa in Japanese; Statistics and Information
1998), administered by the Japanese government, shows that only about
half of Japan’s population undergoes health checkups. The reasons behind
the low demand for health checkups, despite Japan’s comprehensive health
care system, are analyzed in this paper.
There are at least two additional beneﬁts of health checkups that will be
important in the analysis of demand for these checkups. First, a checkup
will likely give an individual a more objective diagnostic health analysis, in
addition to his or her own subjective evaluation of health, made under un-
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agencies or aﬃliated institutions.certainty. Second, health checkups lead to further demand for preventive
medical care when necessary. Early medical care often curtails serious ill-
ness. In this respect, the demand for health checkups diﬀers from the de-
mand for health. The former is a derived demand, whereas the latter is a ﬁ-
nal demand. That is, health checkups appear in the demand for health,
which in turn appears in the individual utility function. However, similar
socioeconomic and demographic factors appear as determinants in both
reduced-form demand functions (Grossman 2000).
In particular, individuals demand more health information as age in-
creases (Kenkel 1990). Time costs are also major determinants of the de-
mand for health checkups, which exhibits a larger time-price elasticity than
the demand for other medical inputs (Phelps and Newhouse 1974; Coﬀey
1983). Income has a positive eﬀect on the demand for preventive medical
care (Kenkel 1994). A better knowledge of one’s own health also increases
the demand for preventive medical care (Hsieh and Lin 1997). However,
better health gives individuals less incentive to collect health information.
Furthermore, lack of knowledge about health leads individuals to adopt
unhealthy consumption patterns (Kenkel 1991). Thus, uncertainty plays
an important role in determining the demand for health checkups, as well
as the demand for health itself (Arrow 1963).
This study focuses on the demand for health checkups rather than the
demand for health. Its purpose is to clarify the reasons behind the low de-
mand for health checkups in Japan. There are few empirical studies that
analyze this issue using microdata from the National Survey of Life (Sta-
tistics and Information 1998). This study takes an original sample of about
630,000 observations from the twenty-to-sixty-four age group. Of this num-
ber, we focus on the thirty-to-sixty age group because this group is more
homogeneous, consisting mainly of working people.
We ﬁnd a gender diﬀerential in the demand for health checkups even af-
ter controlling for other socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.
This diﬀerential tends to disappear as age increases. Age is a major factor
in determining the demand for health checkups within the thirty-to-sixty
age group, but it is less signiﬁcant within smaller age groupings. The type
of health insurance coverage and employer size are also robust factors that
aﬀect an individual’s health checkup demand. Finally, we identify a strong
negative correlation between the health checkup rate and the probability of
becoming ill, as well as the duration of hospitalization.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 10.2 provides an overview
of the health checkup system in Japan. Section 10.3 presents statistics on
health checkups, based on the aforementioned survey. Section 10.4 pres-
ents a theoretical model with a comparative static analysis of the de-
mand for health checkups and describes the variables of interest in this
study. Section 10.5 reports the empirical results, and section 10.6 con-
cludes.
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Japan’s medical insurance system is a comprehensive system covering
the entire population through employees’ health insurance, seamen’s in-
surance, and national health insurance.1 There are three types of employ-
ees’ health insurance: (a) health insurance managed by associations (pro-
vided by employers with 700 employees or more);2 (b) health insurance
managed by the government (provided by employers with fewer than 700
employees); and (c) mutual aid associations insurance, covering public em-
ployees and teachers and personnel in private schools. Employees’ health
insurance covers 80 percent and 70 percent of medical costs for insured per-
sons and their dependents, respectively. National health insurance (NHI)
is a community-based insurance plan for local residents who are not cov-
ered by employees’ health insurance. It pays for 70 percent of medical costs
incurred by all insured persons.3
In March 2000, 15.2 million insured individuals and 16.5 million de-
pendents were covered by health insurance managed by associations. An
additional 19.5 million insured individuals and 17.3 million dependents
were covered by health insurance managed by the government. The third
and ﬁnal employees’ health insurance program, mutual aid associations
insurance, insured 4.5 million individuals and 5.6 million dependents.
There were 0.08 million individuals and 0.14 million dependents covered
by seamen’s insurance. Finally, 47.6 million persons were insured by NHI
(Health and Welfare Statistics Association 2001).
Anybody can have a health checkup regardless of his or her type of
health insurance. This service is provided for employees at their work sites
or at hospitals and clinics in the vicinity of their workplace. Persons cov-
ered by NHI who are not in school receive notices about health checkups
from their local governments. They can receive their health checkups at lo-
cal health centers, hospitals, and clinics. Students in this program receive
their health checkups at their school, college, or university.
There are three types of health checkups provided by ﬁrms: compulsory
health checkups required by law, recommended health checkups, and dis-
cretionary health checkups. A general health checkup is usually compul-
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1. In addition to these insurance systems, there is another system for individuals aged sev-
enty and older, who receive medical care services at minimum cost. A detailed outline of
Japan’s Medical Care Security System is contained in the Outline of Social Insurance in Japan
2000 (Social Insurance Agency, Government of Japan, 2001).
2. The number of employees is not rigid in practice.
3. The contribution rate levied on an employee’s basic wages varies across types of health
insurance. Employees covered by health insurance managed by associations are responsible
for half the contribution rate (not to exceed 4.5 percent), of the set contribution range of 3.0
to 9.0 percent, with the remainder paid by their employers. Employers and employees evenly
split the 8.5 percent contribution rate for health insurance managed by the government. Na-
tional government employees, on the other hand, pay 4.05 percent of their 8.10 percent con-
tribution rate (Social Insurance Agency, Government of Japan, 2001).sory prior to the commencement of employment, and again once every
year throughout the duration of employment. It includes the following
items: (a) report of medical history; (b) self-evaluation and objective eval-
uation of medical symptoms; (c) measurement of height, weight, hearing,
and vision; (d) chest x-ray radiography; (e) measurement of blood pres-
sure; (f) urine examination; (g) anemia testing; (h) analysis of liver func-
tion; (i) testing of blood lipids; (j) testing of blood sugar; and (k) electro-
cardiogram.
Depending upon an employee’s job type, employers must provide items
in addition to this compulsory list. For example, employers must provide a
health checkup once every six months to employees working at night, hav-
ing health-hazardous jobs, or dealing with poisonous chemicals in the
workplace. Employers must give the results of these health checkups to the
district branch of the Labor Standards Inspections Oﬃce. In addition to
these compulsory health checkups, ﬁrms often provide their employees
with another type of health checkup as a fringe beneﬁt: half-day, one-day,
or two-day annual hospital checkups in order to promote the employee’s
health and to ﬁnd sickness at an early stage.4 This type of medical service
for employees, called Nin-gen Dock,is not covered by employees’ health in-
surance. According to The Situations of Fringe Beneﬁts (Institute of Labor
Administration 1998), 81 percent of 5,000 ﬁrms surveyed (sampled from
all industries) subsidize 70 percent or more of the medical costs incurred
from in-hospital comprehensive health checkups.5 On average, employers
pay $350 for such exams, but coverage ranges from $100 to $900.6This sub-
sidy is provided by 89 percent of ﬁrms with 3,000 employees or more, 84
percent of ﬁrms with 1,000–2,999 employees, and 74 percent of ﬁrms with
fewer than 1,000 employees.
Although employers are only legally required to contribute half of the
insurance payments for their employees, the survey shows that ﬁrms often
pay more. Although 84 percent of ﬁrms utilizing health insurance man-
aged by the government pay half the rate, 86 percent of ﬁrms with health
insurance managed by associations pay more than half the rate. Also, 95
percent of ﬁrms with more than 3,000 employees pay more than half of the
contribution rate.
By law, an employer or establishment with more than 1,000 employees
must have its own in-house industrial doctor. Employers dealing with
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4. This health checkup beneﬁt is often extended to the employee’s spouse, parents, and
children as well.
5. Institute of Labor Administration (1998, 278–85 and 334–47). The survey period was
from 19 October to 28 December 1995.
6. All dollar values in this paper are calculated using an exchange rate of 1 dollar  100 yen,
for simplicity. Although a purchasing power parity (PPP) rate of $1   ¥195.35 is used by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD; 1998), we do not believe
that this rate reﬂects reality in Japan. Moreover, the dollar values given can be easily trans-
lated into PPP dollars if the values are halved.health-hazardous or poisonous chemicals at the work site must provide an
on-site doctor when 500 or more workers are employed. Firms with ﬁfty or
more employees must have a contracted medical practitioner or doctor
that acts as an industrial doctor, overseeing the employees’ health condi-
tion. Furthermore, ﬁrms must hire certiﬁed sanitary administrators (SAs).
The number of SAs varies according to the size of the establishment: one
SA for a ﬁrm of 50–200 employees, two SAs for a ﬁrm of 201–500 employ-
ees, three SAs for a ﬁrm of 501–1,000 employees, four SAs for a ﬁrm of
1,001–2,000 employees, ﬁve SAs for a ﬁrm of 2,001–3,000 employees, and
six SAs for a ﬁrm of 3,001 or more employees. These regulations indicate
that employees in larger ﬁrms enjoy better health beneﬁts, including hav-
ing health checkups at their place of work.
Similarly, NHI also provides various types of health checkups to local
residents who are not covered by employees’ health insurance or other
types of health insurance.7 Generally, the local government notiﬁes resi-
dents about the schedules for health checkups. These health checkup peri-
ods are scattered throughout the year to accommodate the seasonal
employment patterns of residents. Residents usually go to a local health
center for their health checkups, but they must go to hospitals and clinics
for some types of medical checkups. They pay the minimum fee according
to the type of health checkup they have.
The types of health checkups provided by local governments are as fol-
lows: (a) group health checkups at local health centers and individual vis-
its to hospitals or clinics, and (b) comprehensive medical health checkups
in hospitals (i.e., the Nin-gen Dock). The former includes the basic health
checkup items listed earlier for a fee of about $10 and tests for the follow-
ing: gastric cancer ($8), carcinoma of the colon and rectum ($5), lung can-
cer (no fee; $5 for examination of sputum), tuberculosis (no fee), carci-
noma cancer uteri ($6), osteoporosis ($5), breast cancer ($10), and other
types of women’s medical tests ($5).8 The latter type of checkup includes
the basic health checkup items plus other services depending on the length
of hospital stay. The subsidies oﬀered by local governments are, for ex-
ample, $175 for a general medical examination (out-of-pocket expenses are
about $190; that is, the total costs are about $365), $250 for a brain exam-
ination (out-of-pocket expenses are about $274), and $375 for a compre-
hensive examination (i.e., general plus brain examination; out-of-pocket
expenses amount to about $410). The above-mentioned health checkups
have age restrictions. For instance, the general medical examinations are
for people aged thirty or higher, and the brain and comprehensive exami-
nations are for those aged forty or higher. These examples also indicate that
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7. Spouses of employees who are covered under employees’ health insurance as dependents
may receive this service by submitting a request to the corresponding local government.
8. The items included in the health checkup and the corresponding fees vary by locality, re-
ﬂecting the budgetary constraints of local governments.employees in larger ﬁrms enjoy better and more varied beneﬁts than do
those in smaller ﬁrms or the self-employed.
The next section provides a statistical overview of the health checkup
program in Japan.
10.3 Health Checkup Statistics
In the preceding section, we discussed health checkups and coverage for
these checkups under diﬀerent types of health insurance. Clearly, the
Japanese have adequate opportunity to undergo health checkups. Here we
report on how many people aged twenty to sixty-four in Japan have health
checkups, based on statistics from the 1995 National Survey of Life (Koku-
min Seikatsu Kiso Chosa, hereafter the Survey). The following summary of
the Survey is quoted from the Japan Statistical Yearbook 1999 (Statistics
Bureau 1998).
This Survey has been conducted by the Ministry of Health and Welfare
every three years, since 1986. The Survey is a sampling survey covering
all households and their household members within the stratiﬁed sample
districts chosen at random from the enumeration districts of the 1990
Population Census, and is conducted by enumerator’s interview method
through the channels of prefectures, designated cities and health centers.
The Survey was taken as of 1 June for about 270,000 households and
about 800,000 household members in 5,100 districts, excluding one pre-
fecture, Hyogo (616).
Table 10.1 gives the proportion of people reporting health checkups, by
gender and age group. The total sample size is 449,051, of which 219,983
are male respondents and 229,068 are female respondents. These propor-
tions reveal at least three noteworthy characteristics. First, the overall av-
erage proportion of individuals having health checkups is 0.557. Second,
the overall proportion of males having health checkups is 0.607, which is
about 10 percentage points above the 0.509 proportion of females. This
diﬀerence narrows as age increases, excepting the thirty-to-thirty-nine age
group (see ﬁg. 10.1). Third, the health checkup rate peaks with the ﬁfty-to-
sixty age group for both males and females. A possible explanation for why
the health checkup gender diﬀerential is widest in the thirty-to-thirty-nine
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Table 10.1 Health Checkup Rates by Gender and Age Group
Age
N 20–64 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–60 61–64
Total 449,051 0.557 0.457 0.521 0.597 0.620 0.585
Males 219,983 0.607 0.487 0.630 0.652 0.653 0.583
Females 229,068 0.509 0.429 0.415 0.543 0.590 0.587
Source: 1995 National Survey of Life, Statistics and Information (1998).age group is that females leave their place of employment to get married
and start a family in this age range. Thus, they may have fewer opportuni-
ties to have their health checked. Most probably, the notiﬁcation for the
checkups now comes from their local government as opposed to from their
workplace. A similar phenomenon occurs with males. There is an abrupt
decline in the proportion of health checkups from the ﬁfty-to-sixty to
sixty-one-to-sixty-four age groups. This probably happens because sixty is
the typical age of retirement. However, we still need to know why the pro-
portion of health checkups increases as age increases. We attribute this
phenomenon partially to the depreciation of health stock.
To examine whether there are diﬀerentials in the health checkup rate
across types of health insurance, we show the checkup rate for each type of
insurance coverage by age group in table 10.2 (graphed in ﬁg. 10.2). In al-
most all age groups, the health checkup proportion is highest for mutual
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Fig. 10.1 Health checkup: Total number, age, and gender
Table 10.2 Health Checkup Rates by Type of Insurance Coverage
Age
N 20–64 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–60 61–64
Health insurance managed by 
associations 106,593 0.647 0.550 0.610 0.704 0.733 0.666
Health insurance managed by 
the government 145,452 0.582 0.474 0.532 0.630 0.668 0.654
Mutual aid associations insurance 49,980 0.692 0.563 0.648 0.755 0.775 0.690
National health insurance 141,424 0.419 0.269 0.311 0.396 0.490 0.550
Seamen’s insurance 1,515 0.576 0.443 0.517 0.568 0.682 0.500
Other health insurance 4,087 0.404 0.354 0.464 0.407 0.400 0.404










































eaid associations insurance and second highest for health insurance man-
aged by associations. A reason for these high health checkup rates is that
employees covered by either of these health insurance plans enjoy more
and better fringe beneﬁts, and, with easier access to health checkups, they
incur fewer costs. As noted in section 10.2, ﬁrms with 1,000 or more em-
ployees must have an industrial doctor and medical assistants such as
nurses on site. By comparison, smaller ﬁrms may provide fewer medical fa-
cilities and services at their work sites, and they may not want employees
to leave their jobs simply for health checkups. The employees themselves
may face peer pressure not to take a day oﬀ for a health checkup. In re-
sponse to this problem, branches of the Supervision of Labor Standards
work to facilitate the provision of checkups, both by informing employers
of their necessity and by parking medical vehicles with x-ray radiation
equipment at or near work sites. As in table 10.1, the health checkup rate
peaks in the ﬁfty-to-sixty age range.
To conﬁrm the existence of opportunities for health checkups among em-
ployees in relatively large establishments, we present health checkup rates by
employment status in table 10.3. Again, we ﬁnd that employees in larger
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Table 10.3 Health Checkup Rates by Employment Status
Age
N 20–64 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–60 61–64
Self-employed with employees 16,137 0.412 0.269 0.313 0.389 0.456 0.504
Self-employed without employees 25,831 0.447 0.256 0.309 0.412 0.481 0.555
Family workers 22,649 0.416 0.212 0.296 0.412 0.529 0.595
Company and association workers 15,325 0.617 0.463 0.540 0.608 0.682 0.689
Employed in a general enterprise 
with 1–4 employees 10,965 0.377 0.250 0325 0.427 0.477 0.492
Employed in a general enterprise 
with 5–29 employees 51,347 0.533 0.410 0.516 0.582 0.616 0.625
Employed in a general enterprise 
with 30–99 employees 45,075 0.660 0.549 0.650 0.705 0.735 0.726
Employed in a general enterprise 
with 100–499 employees 41,724 0.732 0.638 0.740 0.778 0.789 0.749
Employed in a general enterprise 
with 500–999 employees 13,063 0.750 0.661 0.748 0.814 0.815 0.748
Employed in a general enterprise 
with 1,000+ employees 63,248 0.803 0.709 0.810 0.853 0.862 0.811
Public employees 26,326 0.810 0.695 0.798 0.857 0.857 0.781
Monthly part-time workers 10,381 0.549 0.348 0.470 0.606 0.456 0.689
Daily part-time workers 2,980 0.448 0.262 0.352 0.492 0.529 0.602
Household workers 2,465 0.432 0.157 0.306 0.473 0.519 0.531
Others 5,470 0.459 0.285 0.388 0.501 0.561 0.575
Not working 123,065 0.409 0.265 0.286 0.424 0.528 0.552
Source: 1995 National Survey of Life, Statistics and Information (1998).ﬁrms have very high health checkup rates. For example, employees in enter-
prises with over 1,000 workers have the highest rate among the general en-
terprises (that is, private ﬁrms); the proportion of workers having health
checkups is 80 percent or more except for the twenty-to-twenty-nine age
group. The overall rate for all age groups is highest for public employees
(0.810). In addition, for most types of employees, the highest health checkup
rates occur in the forty-to-forty-nine and ﬁfty-to-sixty age groups, as shown
in ﬁgure 10.3. However, among self-employed, part-time, and household
workers, the proportion of health checkup recipients is largest for the sixty-
one-to-sixty-four age group. In addition to facing a higher risk of sickness,
older individuals may have more time available to go for checkups.
Table 10.4and ﬁgure 10.4show health checkup rates by industry and age
group. Note that security employees have the highest overall health
checkup rate: 0.752. This high rate reﬂects the occupational requirement
mentioned earlier: People who work at night must have health checkups
twice a year. Hence, the law enforcement industry is highly eﬀective in en-
couraging its employees to have health checkups.
Finally, we examine the attitude of people who have symptoms of sick-
ness or who are regularly visiting the hospital toward health checkups. We
hypothesize a priori that these people, who are aware of their sickness or
who are at high risk of becoming sick, are more likely to go for a checkup.
Table 10.5 provides a summary of the evidence on this assumption. In the
twenty-to-sixty-four age group, the overall diﬀerence in health checkup
rates between people with no symptoms (symptom   0) and people with
symptoms (symptom   1) is nearly 10 percentage points. The age subdivi-
sions reveal that the diﬀerential increases with age.
In contrast, gender diﬀerences in health checkup rates for both the
symptomatic and the symptom-free groups are virtually eliminated by age
sixty-one to sixty-four. We cannot satisfactorily explain why the diﬀerence
between the gender groups is so large regardless of whether symptoms are
present. For instance, there is a 20 percentage point diﬀerence between
males and females in the thirty-to-thirty-nine age group and a 10 percent-
age point diﬀerence in the forty-to-forty-nine age group. Females always
have lower health checkup rates than males until the age of sixty. Attribut-
ing these gender diﬀerences solely to employment diﬀerences is both too
hasty and too demanding of employment diﬀerences. At this point, it
seems more reasonable to assume that men and women have diﬀerent atti-
tudes toward health risks. Similar results are obtained for hospital visits.9
The ﬁndings from this National Survey of Life sample of approximately
450,000 people, aged twenty to sixty-four, may be summarized as follows:
1. Males and females have distinctly diﬀerent attitudes toward health
checkups.
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)2. As people grow older (e.g., from age group forty to forty-nine to age
group sixty to sixty-four), they become more health conscious.
3. People with health insurance managed by associations or mutual aid
associations insurance have more health checkups than those covered by
other types of health insurance.
4. Employees in relatively large establishments (e.g., with 500 workers
or more) have better access to health checkups. This is also true for public
employees.
5. People employed in security-related jobs have the highest health
checkup rate.
6. People with symptoms of illness undergo health checkups more often
than do people without symptoms.
7. Regardless of whether they display symptoms of illnesses (visit the
hospital or not), males usually have health checkups more frequently than
do females.




As noted above, only 56 percent of twenty- to sixty-four-year-old Japan-
ese had health checkups in 1995. Nearly half the population did not un-
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Table 10.4 Health Checkup Rates by Industry
Age
N 20–64 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–60 61–64
Professional 49,819 0.659 0.594 0.665 0.693 0.696 0.610
Administrative 21,265 0.717 0.529 0.652 0.737 0.754 0.726
Clerical 55,745 0.657 0.590 0.683 0.729 0.745 0.707
Sales 36,534 0.517 0.452 0.505 0.541 0.549 0.550
Service 32,804 0.526 0.421 0.490 0.549 0.597 0.600
Security 3,757 0.752 0.639 0.745 0.818 0.774 0.715
Agriculture 13,811 0.567 0.316 0.391 0.533 0.617 0.634
Forestry 758 0.589 0.333 0.390 0.541 0.655 0.694
Fishery 2,174 0.453 0.307 0.328 0.446 0.544 0.500
Transportation and 
communication 10,796 0.653 0.503 0.633 0.679 0.733 0.680
Craftsmena 83,173 0.602 0.528 0.588 0.623 0.642 0.614
None of the above 4,603 0.535 0.440 0.520 0.542 0.587 0.580
Unknown 133,994 0.423 0.286 0.314 0.445 0.524 0.560
Source: 1995 National Survey of Life, Statistics and Information (1998).























































edergo a health checkup despite the fact that these checkups can identify ill-
nesses at early stages. There are a number of possible explanations for this
phenomenon. One explanation is that most people are risk lovers, but this
seems unlikely. Another is that most people are risk averse but feel they
have adequate knowledge concerning their health status; thus, the mar-
ginal beneﬁts of having a health checkup are lower than the costs. There
are too many other possible explanations to mention. However, it is clear
that uncertainty about one’s health and the incidence of disease plays an
important role in the decision to have a checkup. Generally, a person can
prevent future ﬁnancial loss and psychological burdens by having more
and better information with regard to his or her present health status. This
kind of information could be provided by a health checkup.
In this section, we present an application of the theory of insurance under
uncertainty. This theory aims to explain an individual’s choice of whether to
have a health checkup in response to changes in exogenous factors.
Let us assume that an individual’s preferences can be represented by a
utility function,
(1) U   U(S1, S2;  1,  2).
Utility is deﬁned over the contingent earning capacity (S1, S2).10 The cor-
responding probabilities,  1 and  2, are parameters of the utility function,
since the value of a state-contingent earning capacity depends on how
likely the state is to occur.11
Suppose there is an event S1 that an individual faces with probability  1.
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Table 10.5 Health Checkup Rates by Symptoms and Gender
Age
N 20–64 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–60 61–64
Symptoms = 0
Total 339,013 0.534 0.454 0.515 0.581 0.585 0.524
Males 171,577 0.586 0.481 0.622 0.636 0.621 0.524
Females 167,436 0.480 0.426 0.405 0.526 0.549 0.523
Symptoms = 1
Total 110,038 0.629 0.476 0.549 0.652 0.685 0.655
Males 48,406 0.683 0.536 0.676 0.712 0.717 0.654
Females 61,632 0.586 0.444 0.456 0.599 0.658 0.655
Source: 1995 National Survey of Life, Statistics and Information (1998).
10. Wealth, rather than earning capacity, is typically used in uncertainty models (e.g., Sil-
berberg 1990). However, since we apply the theory of household production to the model, the
use of earning capacity is appropriate and can be assumed to reﬂect all monetary measures,
including wealth.
11. This simple application of the theory of insurance under uncertainty is based on Pauly
(1989, 309–19) and Silberberg (1990, 445–47).If S1 occurs, the individual maintains his initial health-related earnings en-
dowment S0 by incurring the cost of preventive activities h, which we take
to be a health checkup.12In addition, the individual pays the insurance pre-
mium (or tax) P required by his type of health insurance, whose purpose is
to protect him from a loss of his earnings endowment S0 due to sudden ill-
ness. Thus, S1 is deﬁned as
(2) S1   S0   h   P.
The individual faces a second event S2 with probability  2, in which he
suﬀers a loss L of his earnings capacity. We assume that the magnitude of
the loss increases with the individual’s age A. That is, the individual’s op-
portunity costs increase (at a diminishing rate) as age increases.13 In addi-
tion, the stock of health eventually depreciates with age. Finally, we also as-
sume an additional factor H as an argument of L. The individual may
engage in some health-promoting activities H to increase his health stock
HS. Loss L is deﬁned as follows:






















    0.
In equation (3), the size of L depends on the type of illness.14 Diﬀerent
illnesses are associated with diﬀerent measurable symptoms (with some
overlap) such as high blood pressure, high cholesterol, proteinuria, and
high white blood cell count. Each symptom sj is associated with a particu-
lar illness and, hence, with a particular loss Lj. Having a health checkup is
inﬂuenced by subjective or objective symptoms or both, so that
(4) h   h(sj), j   1, . . . , n.
If symptoms have a probability distribution  j(sj), then having a health
checkup is an inverse function of symptoms,
(5)  j
 1(h)   (sj).
Therefore, the relationship between the health checkup h and loss Lj is
(6)  j∗(h)Lj,
where  j∗ is probability associated with Lj. The expected loss due to illness
can be expressed as
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12. For simplicity, we omit the individual subscript i and also assume the individual to be
male.
13. The implicit assumption here is that health stock accumulates up to a certain age.
14. For example, the major diseases among ﬁfty- to sixty-year-old Japanese are diseases of
the digestive system, circulatory system, musculoskeletal system and connective tissue, and
nervous system and sense organs (Statistics Bureau 1998, 670–71).Finally, if event 2 occurs, the individual receives medical care, which has
the eﬀect of augmenting earnings capacity by M. However, obtaining med-
ical care entails some costs, such as the discomfort associated with long
waits in clinics and hospitals.15 This “psychological burden” should be in-
cluded in the cost calculation as –gM, where 0   g   1. Now, event 2 can
be deﬁned in terms of costs and beneﬁts in money-equivalent units:
(8) S2   S0   h   P    ∗(h)L(A, H)   (1   g)M
Finally,  1 and  2, the probabilities attached to events 1 and 2, are func-
tions of an individual’s age A.16 As an individual ages, he becomes more
susceptible to illness. We express the individual’s preferences over uncer-
tain prospects using an expected utility function, or a Von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function, as follows:
(9) EU   [1    (A)]U(S0   h   P) 
   (A)U[S0   h   P    ∗(h)L(A, H)   (1   g)M]
The value of h that maximizes EU satisﬁes the following ﬁrst-order con-
dition:
(10) [1    (A)]Ux(x)    (A)Uy(y)[1    ∗
hL(A, H)]   0, at h   0,
or
(11)   
























x   S0 – h – P,
y   S0 – h – P –  ∗(h)L(A, H)   (1 – g)M,
Ux   ∂U/∂x   0,
Uy   ∂U/∂y   0,
 ∗
h   [∂ ∗(h)]/∂h   0.
In equation (11), the expression on the left-hand side is the marginal pro-
ductivity of the health checkup (Ehrlich and Becker 1972, 634).17The equi-
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15. Approximately 49 percent of patients in large hospitals wait for at least an hour and a
half, and 15 percent wait for more than three hours. By comparison, these rates are 44 per-
cent and 17.2 percent for medium-sized hospitals, and 28 percent and 15.6 percent for small
hospitals (Health and Welfare Statistics Association 1999, 84). However, medical examina-
tions in hospitals are very quick; almost 64 percent of patients in large hospitals take only ten
minutes or less for their examinations, and 18 percent take less than three minutes. About 61
percent and 57 percent of patients in medium-sized and small hospitals, respectively, take ten
minutes or less for their medical examinations.
16. Here we drop the state subscripts so that     2 and 1 –     1.
17. According to Ehrlich and Becker (1972), the left-hand side expression of equation (11)
in this presentation is the slope of the production transformation curve, and the right-hand
side is the slope of the indiﬀerence curve of S1, S2. Hence, both sides must be equal in equi-
librium for h   0.librium condition requires 1    ∗
hL(A, H)   0. That is, an additional dol-
lar spent on health checkups must reduce the expected loss by more than a
dollar.18 In other words, if an individual does not expect the beneﬁts from
the reduction of his expected loss to be greater than the cost of the health
checkup, he will not have the health checkup. Using equation (10) to re-
state this point, if the maximum EU occurs when h   0, rather than when
h 0, then necessarily EU  0; hence, we will have a corner solution. Fur-
thermore, even if h   0 to start with, there may be some range of EU over
which EU  0. This may be the case when –1    ∗
hL(A, H)   0. Then the
individual will not have a health checkup, because EU(h   0)   EU(h  
0). For example, when the individual already has adequate, positive infor-
mation on his current health condition, it does not make any sense for him
to see a medical doctor at the hospital for a slight cough.
The second-order condition of equation (10) requires
(12) D   [1    (A)]Uxx    (A)Uyy[1    ∗
hL(A, H)]2   0,
where
Uxx   ∂Ux/∂x   0,
Uyy   ∂Uy/∂x   0,
∂ ∗
h/∂h   [∂2 ∗(h)]/∂h2   0 (assumed without loss).
The eﬀect of age on the demand for a health checkup h can be found by
partially diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order optimality condition, equation (10),






     
D
1
 {  AUx   [1    ∗
hL(A, H)][ AUy    (A) ∗(h)UyyLA] 
   (A) ∗
hUyL A}   0
where
  A   [∂ (A)]/∂A   0,
L A   [∂L(A, H)]/∂A   0.
The above suggests that as people grow older, they become more health
conscious and hence go for their health checkups.
Let us now consider the case of an increase in the health insurance pre-
mium (or tax) P. That is, the relative coverage of medical care decreases in
clinics and hospitals. The eﬀect of an increase in P on health checkups is










 {[1   (A)]Uxx   (A)Uyy[1    ∗
hL(A, H)]}   0,
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18. The reduction in this context might be due to “self-protection.” In Ehrlich and Becker,
“self-insurance [is] a reduction in the size of a loss, and self-protection [is] a reduction in the
probability of a loss” (1972, 633).since [(1 –  (A))Uxx    (A)Uyy(1    ∗
hL(A, H))]   0 (see the appendix). In
other words, as medical care coverage increases, an individual is more
likely to have a health checkup.
The eﬀect of an increase in an individual’s initial endowment S0 is posi-







     
D
1
 {[1   (A)]Uxx    (A)Uyy[1    ∗
hL(A, H)]}   0.
This result in equation (15) shows that individuals with higher earning po-
tential—for instance, those with larger stocks of human capital—are will-
ing to have health checkups to secure against future earnings losses.
We now consider whether an individual who is willing to participate in
health-stock-augmenting activities will have a health checkup. By partially






     
D
1
 ( (A)LH{ ∗
hUy    ∗(h)Uyy[1    ∗
hL(A, H)]})   0, 






    0.
Hence, an increase in health-stock-augmenting activities, which raises
earnings capacity through an increase in the individual’s health stock, will
tend to encourage the individual to have health checkups in order to avoid
an earnings loss due to sudden illness.
We can also evaluate the eﬀect of the psychological burden g, which is a
burden incurred by an individual due to his illness. When an individual is
sick and has to wait for many hours at a busy hospital, there are psycho-
logical costs, such as fatigue. In cases of severe illness, he may have to be
hospitalized and medical treatment may take several hours or days. The






     
D
1
 { (A)Uyy[1    ∗
hL(A, H)]( M)}   0.
When an individual believes he is prone to some serious illness, perhaps
through his job, he is more willing to have a health checkup in order to
lessen the psychological burden should he fall ill.







     
D
1
 { (A)Uyy[1    ∗
hL(A, H)](1   g)}   0.
Hence, the individual becomes less self-protective as beneﬁts increase, the
classical moral hazard result.
Finally, we consider the eﬀect of gender on health checkups. In equation
284 Tadashi Yamada and Tetsuji Yamada(7), the expected loss  ∗(h)L(A, H) can be computed separately by gender.
Suppose
(19) L  
f    f(h)Lf(A, H)   L  m     m(h)Lm(A, H),
where L  i  is a gender-speciﬁc expected loss (i   f, m: f   females, and m  
males). L  i  is a positive function of both  i(h) and Li(A, H), and we assume
 f(h)    m(h) and L
f(A, H)   Lm(A, H).
The eﬀect of an increase (or shift) in the probability distribution over







     
D
1
 { (A)Uyy[ Li(A, H)][1    ∗
hL(A, H)]}   0,
which follows from the assumption, (∂ 
∗
h)/[∂ i(h)]   0.
The above result indicates that individuals who are more prone to illness
are more likely to have health checkups. The positive relationship can also
be applied to L  i  ; that is, ∂h/∂L  i     0. Therefore, under the assumptions
listed above, males are more likely to have health checkups than females.
These comparative static predictions must now be evaluated in an em-
pirical setting. For the empirical speciﬁcation, we assume that an individ-
ual’s decision to have a health checkup depends on an unobservable utility
index Ii, deﬁned as
(21) Ii   Xi    ui,
where Xi is a (1   k) row vector of explanatory variables that determine Ii,
  is a (k   1) column vector of parameters to be estimated, and ui is a nor-
mally distributed random error term. The larger the value of the index Ii,
the greater the probability an individual will have a health checkup.
We further assume that there is a critical level of the index Ii∗, such that
if Ii exceeds Ii∗, the individual will have a health checkup, and otherwise he
will not. In terms of the notation used above, [1    ∗
hL(A, H)]   0 and
∂EU/∂h   0 at h   0 imply Ii – Ii∗   0. Let h   1 if the individual has a
health checkup, and h   0 if he does not. Since Ii, Ii∗, and [1    ∗
hL(A, H)]
are not observable, we assume Iiand Ii∗to be normally distributed with the
same mean and variance. Then, the probability that the individual has a
health checkup can be expressed as
(22) Prob(h   1)   Prob(I∗
h   Ii)   F(Ii)   
 
1
2   




where F( ) is the cumulative distribution function, and t is a standardized
normal variable—that is, t~ N(0, 1).19We estimate a probit model of the de-
mand for health checkups and a tobit model for the length of hospital stay.
The next section presents the explanatory variables used in these analyses.
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19. The presentation of this probit model is from Gujarati (1995, 563–64).10.4.2 Variables
Using the model outlined above, we examine the eﬀects of several vari-
ables on the demand for health checkups. The dependent variable is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the individual has a health checkup and 0
otherwise.
A critical factor in explaining the variation in demand for medical health
checkups is age. Theoretically, the relationship between age and medical
health checkups should be positive and slowly increasing until the age of
sixty, and declining thereafter. The reason for this decline is that the retire-
ment age is sixty for those working in relatively large ﬁrms (see table 10.6).20
Note, however, that new retirees are still eligible for a type of health insur-
ance managed by associations or health insurance managed by the gov-
ernment for two years following retirement. Otherwise, these individuals
purchase NHI.
Gender is another major explanatory variable used in this analysis. The
male health checkup rate always exceeds the female rate in the twenty-to-
sixty-four age range. This diﬀerential in health checkup rates certainly
results from biological diﬀerences as well as socioeconomic and demo-
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Table 10.6 Distribution of Retirement Ages by Firm Size and Industry, 1997
Retirement Age (%)
Under 55 56–59 60 61–64 65
Firm size
30–99 5.7 6.6 78.4 0.9 8.3
100–299 2.7 2.5 88.1 2.9 3.8
300–999 1.9 2.3 91.9 2.0 1.9
1,000–4,999 0.1 0.4 96.8 1.7 1.0
5,000 and over 0.0 0.0 98.0 0.7 1.3
Industry
Mining 5.8 8.3 76.7 3.3 5.8
Construction 3.6 1.7 69.6 0.9 23.9
Manufacturing 4.2 4.2 86.8 1.1 3.5
Electricity 3.1 4.7 89.8 1.6 0.8
Transportation and 
communication 3.6 9.4 76.3 5.2 5.6
Wholesale and retail 7.3 6.4 84.5 0.3 1.5
Finance and insurance 2.3 1.7 93.8 1.2 1.1
Real estate 1.7 2.8 89.2 0.8 5.5
Services 3.9 6.2 77.9 1.9 10.0
Source: Statistics Bureau (1998, 94).
Notes: Electricity includes gas, heat, and water as well as electricity. Wholesale and retail in-
dustry includes eating and drinking establishments.
20. Employees covered by employees’ health insurance obtain NHI after retirement.graphic variables. We examine the eﬀect of gender on the demand for
health checkups, ceteris paribus.
In addition to the above demographic variables, another important ex-
planatory variable is health insurance coverage. This includes health in-
surance managed by associations, health insurance managed by the gov-
ernment, and NHI. The former two types of insurance cover 80 percent of
medical costs (70 percent for dependents), whereas the NHI covers 70 per-
cent for everyone.
To  examine the eﬀect of an individual’s initial endowment on health
checkups, we use a dummy variable to indicate the household’s highest in-
come earner (the breadwinner) and include the household’s monthly ex-
penditure, which should have an income eﬀect on the demand for health
checkups. To account for nonreporting bias, we include a dummy variable
for those records with missing income values.
To measure an individual’s health-stock-augmenting activities, we use
the frequency of daily practices such as eating regular meals, nutritiously
balanced meals, and not-too-salty meals; eating in moderation; exercising;
getting adequate sleep; and taking time to refresh oneself during the day.
We hypothesize that the eﬀect of this variable on the demand for health
checkups is positive.
To evaluate the eﬀect of the psychological burden associated with illness,
the number of illnesses the individual reports is included as an explanatory
variable. This number includes diseases of the circulatory system, respira-
tory system, digestive system, genitourinary system, and so forth. Al-
though the illnesses of each system could be explanatory variables in the
regression, we elect not to use this approach because of the diﬃculty in
evaluating diﬀerences in the eﬀects. Also, there are too many to be mean-
ingful for our purposes. In addition to the illness variable, we include the
number of stressful events the individual has had to face. These two ex-
planatory variables are considered to be objective measures of health. To
avoid speciﬁcation error, the subjective evaluation of an individual’s health
condition should also be included in the regression analysis. To do this, we
use three dummy variables indicating whether the individual feels he or she
is in excellent, good, or fair health.
To capture the eﬀect of medical beneﬁts on the demand for health check-
ups, we use a life insurance variable as a proxy for beneﬁts. There are vari-
ous types of life insurance. Some provide coverage only for hospitalization
costs and injuries.
To examine the eﬀect of a change in the likelihood of illness on health
checkups, we use a dummy variable for whether the individual has visited
a clinic or hospital in the past year. If the individual did not visit either for
an entire year, the individual is considered to be healthy, ceteris paribus.
The probability that he or she falls ill is lower than that of someone who has
visited these institutions in recent months.
The Demand for Health Checkups under Uncertainty 287In addition to the explanatory variables described above, variables
measuring education, ﬁrm size, type of employment, population size, and
regional dummies are also included in the regression models. The deﬁni-
tions and summary statistics of all of the variables are reported in table
10.7.21 In the next section, we report the empirical results of the probit
analysis.
10.5 Empirical Results
10.5.1 Health Checkup Results for the 20–64 and 30–60 Age Groups
Table 10.8 reports the results of probit and ordinary least squares (OLS;
linear probability model) analyses for the twenty-to-sixty-four and thirty-
to-sixty age groups. Table 10.9 reports the results of the thirty-to-sixty age
group by gender. The overall results are quite similar in terms of the sig-
niﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcients, which are very robust. The OLS es-
timates are shown for comparative purposes. We will mainly discuss the re-
sults of the probit model in terms of the signs of the estimated coeﬃcients.
First, MALE is signiﬁcant and positive in both age groups, as expected
(see table 10.8). After controlling for other socioeconomic and demo-
graphic variables (discussed in section 10.4), we do not reject the argument
that males are more likely than females to have health checkups because
their genetic and biological characteristics make them more prone to ill-
ness. The estimated coeﬃcients on AGE and AGESQ (age2) are both
highly signiﬁcant. The positive estimated coeﬃcient on AGE and the neg-
ative estimated coeﬃcient on AGESQ for both age groups indicate that the
proﬁle of health checkups is concave in age. The probit estimate on AGE
for the thirty-to-sixty age group is 0.083 and is about twice as large as that
for the twenty-to-sixty-four age group, which is 0.037. This shows that the
former is more concerned with their health than the latter. The changes in
the health checkup rate as age increases, or the estimated coeﬃcient on
AGESQ, indicate that individuals lose health stock as they age.
As mentioned earlier, health checkups are time-consuming health in-
puts. Hence, the opportunity cost of lost work hours or days for the sake of
a health checkup should be a major determinant of an individual’s decision
to have a health checkup. The sign of the wage rate (WAGE) is negative and
highly signiﬁcant. Again, the probit coeﬃcient for the thirty-to-sixty age
group (–0.259) is two times larger in absolute value than that for the
twenty-to-sixty-four population (–0.139). The corresponding t-statistics
also indicate stronger signiﬁcance of the former than of the latter.22The es-
288 Tadashi Yamada and Tetsuji Yamada
21. This study focuses on those aged thirty to sixty. However, statistics for the twenty-to-
sixty-four age group are also reported. Gender-speciﬁc statistics are available from the au-
thors upon request.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.timated coeﬃcient on the variable BREADWIN is signiﬁcantly positive,
and the robust eﬀect shows, as previously hypothesized, that the highest
earner of a household is more willing to have health checkups to secure
against the loss of earnings that would result from becoming ill. From the
estimated coeﬃcient on monthly household expenditures (MONTHEXP),
we see that the income elasticity of the demand for health checkups is pos-
itive.
The individual’s type of health insurance coverage is included as the pol-
icy variable in the model: ASOCHI, GOVTHI, MUTUHI, and NHI. As
expected, the coeﬃcients on the ﬁrst three variables are positive, while that
on NHI is negative. All estimates are statistically signiﬁcant. Hence, the
greater the coverage of medical care, the more likely the individual is to
have a health checkup. If health checkups do constitute preventive medical
care, individuals having health checkups will be less prone to illness.23 As
of 1995, life expectancy in Japan was 77.01 years for males and 83.59 years
for females (Statistics Bureau 1998). The longevity of the Japanese may be
attributed to the current health checkup program under the comprehen-
sive health (medical) insurance system.
Normally, ﬁrms with a larger number of employees face more restric-
tions regarding employees’ working conditions. Therefore, these ﬁrms usu-
ally provide more and better fringe beneﬁts compared to ﬁrms with fewer
employees. In our study, we use SIZE1000 for institutions with 1,000 em-
ployees or more, SIZE500 for those with 500–999 employees, SIZE100 for
those with 100–499 employees, SIZE30 for those with 30–99 employees,
SIZE5 for those with 5–29 employees, SIZE1 for those with 1–5 employees,
and PUBEMPLY for public employees.24The estimated coeﬃcients on the
variables SIZE5 to SIZE1000 are highly signiﬁcant and positive, as is that
of PUBEMPLY. On the other hand, small institutions that fall within
SIZE1 have a negative estimated coeﬃcient. These results are indicative of
the better working environments provided by larger ﬁrms.
We now turn to the eﬀects of the individual’s health condition on the de-
mand for health checkups, holding constant the subjective evaluation of
own health (HLTHEXCE, HLTHGOOD, and HLTHFAIR). First, the
sign of the estimated coeﬃcient on NOTVISIT is negative, while that on
HLTHPRAC is positive. The former is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
the individual did not visit any medical institutions during the past year.
The latter is the number of health-related daily practices in which the indi-
vidual engages (e.g., eating regular meals; eating low-salt, nutritionally
balanced meals; getting adequate physical exercise and adequate hours of
sleep; and so on). The signs of these variables conform to expectations. In
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23. This issue will be discussed further when we present the empirical results on the proba-
bility of hospitalization.
24. The omitted dummy variable for ﬁrm size indicates the self-employed, family workers,
part-time workers, and the unemployed.other words, an individual with better health (or more health stock) is less
likely to have a health checkup. On the other hand, a health-conscious per-
son, that is, an individual who practices health-stock-augmenting activi-
ties, tends to have health checkups. For these health-conscious people,
having a health checkup is another way of preventing health deterioration.
To evaluate the eﬀect of the psychological burden of being ill, the vari-
ables SICKNUMB (the number of injuries and illnesses) and STRESS (the
number of stressful events encountered) are included as explanatory vari-
ables. We hypothesized in the previous discussion that the psychological
burdens of being ill and being in a queue at a hospital will provide incen-
tives for the individual not to become ill. It is thus possible that the indi-
vidual will go for health checkups to avoid becoming a patient. Both esti-
mated coeﬃcients on SICKNUMB and STRESS are positive and highly
signiﬁcant. The sizes of the coeﬃcients for the twenty-to-sixty-four age
group are almost identical to those of the thirty-to-sixty age group, ceteris
paribus.
Finally, we examine the estimated coeﬃcients on education (EDU) and
life insurance (LIFEINSU). Education is usually considered to be a factor
that increases the eﬃciency of health production. The variable normally
has a positive eﬀect on the demand for preventive medical care (Coﬀey
1983; Kenkel 1994; and Hsieh and Lin 1997, to name only a few). However,
according to Grossman (1972), the coeﬃcient on education depends on the
elasticity of the MEC schedule, or the demand for health stock. The sign
of an individual’s education level is negative if the elasticity is less than 1 in
absolute value. In this respect, the estimated negative coeﬃcient is not nec-
essarily wrong.25 The estimated eﬀect of LIFEINSU on the demand for
health checkups is negative. That is, an individual with life insurance is less
likely to have a health checkup. This result is similar to the canonical story
of an individual who buys insurance, but also gambles (see Silberberg 1990,
453). One may also take the view that the signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient
reﬂects the moral hazard inherent in the health checkup decision.
10.5.2 Other Health Checkup Results
This section highlights some results from breakdowns of the sample.
Table 10.9 reports gender-speciﬁc results for the population aged thirty to
sixty, and table 10.10 reports age group–speciﬁc results for ages thirty to
thirty-nine, forty to forty-nine, and ﬁfty to sixty.
First, concerning the gender-speciﬁc results in table 10.9, the age eﬀect
(AGE) is much stronger for females (0.090) than for males (0.044). After
controlling for all other socioeconomic and demographic factors, females
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25. However, the deﬁnitive sign analysis must await further study using microdata on edu-
cation, since our survey data do not provide this variable. Therefore, we use a proxy variable
(see EDU in table 10.7).Table 10.10 Probit Estimates of Health Checkup Probabilities by Age
Age 30–39 Probit Age 40–49 Probit Age 50–60 Probit
Variable Coeﬃcient t-statistica Coeﬃcient t-statistica Coeﬃcient t-statistica
C– 1.568 –2.121 –1.364 –1.180 2.690 1.854
MALE 0.187 7.233 –0.016 –0.592 –0.157 –5.983
AGE 0.040 0.940 0.025 0.471 –0.132 –2.484
AGESQ –0.000 –0.182 –0.000 –0.230 0.001 2.710
MARRIED 0.015 1.335 0.144 11.513 0.161 11.423
WAGE –0.192 –4.724 –0.041 –1.436 0.017 0.728
BREADWIN 0.105 8.213 0.077 5.809 0.108 7.200
MONTHEXP 0.000 1.248 0.000 2.791 0.000 3.179
MOEXPDUM –0.063 –3.088 –0.075 –4.397 –0.114 –6.643
ASOCHI 0.155 3.697 0.374 10.478 0.387 10.395
GOVTHI 0.037 0.886 0.262 7.469 0.281 7.732
MUTUHI 0.101 2.325 0.370 9.870 0.353 8.811
NHI –0.220 –5.257 –0.062 –1.766 0.011 0.302
SIZE1000 1.042 49.837 0.921 47.915 0.834 35.867
SIZE500 0.857 30.132 0.800 29.196 0.671 20.424
SIZE100 0.863 47.605 0.690 42.490 0.589 31.465
SIZE30 0.632 36.406 0.501 33.330 0.432 25.812
SIZE5 0.332 20.545 0.211 15.371 0.135 8.954
SIZE1 –0.052 –1.788 –0.051 –2.137 –0.111 –3.921
PUBEMPLY 0.945 36.809 0.810 32.710 0.690 23.312
DOCTOR 0.000 2.172 0.000 0.238 0.000 –2.697
PROFES 0.157 10.364 0.109 7.850 0.053 3.176
ADMINI 0.259 9.698 0.233 12.349 0.212 11.552
CLERIC 0.215 14.240 0.151 10.708 0.106 5.974
SALES 0.010 0.603 –0.020 –1.420 –0.071 –4.587
SERVIC –0.038 –1.980 –0.031 –2.009 –0.024 –1.462
SECURI 0.077 1.553 0.173 3.589 0.072 1.227
TRANSP 0.006 0.206 –0.010 –0.396 0.136 4.845
SICKNUMB 0.116 13.779 0.136 22.543 0.145 30.871
STRESS 0.035 12.853 0.049 19.166 0.065 21.517
NOTVISIT –0.115 –7.001 –0.191 –14.560 –0.227 –15.178
HLTHPRAC 0.059 22.444 0.070 30.617 0.103 45.437
HLTHEXCE 0.307 17.221 0.425 28.466 0.460 31.930
HLTHGOOD 0.355 19.156 0.497 31.449 0.537 35.152
HLTHFAIR 0.345 20.310 0.451 32.998 0.510 40.665
EDU –0.786 –7.632 –0.747 –8.132 –0.482 –5.057
LIFEINSU –0.000 –3.053 –0.000 –3.502 –0.000 –3.860
POP1M –0.049 –2.684 –0.062 –3.829 –0.078 –4.730
POP150 –0.074 –5.550 –0.073 –6.224 –0.065 –5.362
POP50 0.132 7.400 0.110 7.004 0.108 6.669
POPCUNTY 0.229 17.353 0.234 20.253 0.248 20.537
R2 0.2111 0.1774 0.1566
Log-likelihood –51,588.9 –66,409.0 –61,864.5
N 89,041 114,567 106,526
Note: All regressions include the eleven regional dummies.
aCoeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level, and 10 percent level if the asymptotic
t-statistics are greater than 2.576, 1.960, and 1.645, respectively.are more likely to have health checkups than males as age increases. We are
unable to satisfactorily justify why there exists a large diﬀerence in the es-
timates. However, we oﬀer the following explanation. The health stock of
a female is, for genetic and biological reasons, larger than that of a male.
Ceteris paribus, females need more preventive health care. Therefore, they
are more willing to have health checkups as they age.
Another noticeable diﬀerence is that the estimated coeﬃcient on MAR-
RIED is positive for males (0.161) and positive but very small for females
(0.005). A married male bears more responsibility for his household than
does a single unmarried male, and thus he must have health checkups to
avoid health loss. The coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant for females.
The estimated coeﬃcient on NHI is negative and statistically signiﬁcant
for males but positive and not signiﬁcant for females. It is highly desirable
from a policy perspective to motivate self-employed males, including farm-
ers, to have health checkups. If the government is interested in promoting
health checkups as a way to prevent illness, these men could be targeted
with incentives.
With regard to the industry dummies, the estimates on SALES and
SERVICES are negative and statistically signiﬁcant for males. Therefore,
for the same reasons mentioned for NHI, the government needs to be con-
cerned about the working conditions that prevent employees in these in-
dustries from having health checkups. Males in the SALES and SER-
VICES industries could also be candidates for targeted incentives to
encourage check-ups.
Turning to the age group results in table 10.10, the eﬀect of MARRIED
is not important for the youngest age group (thirty to thirty-nine) but is a
dominant factor for the older groups. On the other hand, WAGE has a neg-
ative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the youngest group, whereas it is nega-
tive and insigniﬁcant for the forty-to-forty-nine group and positive and
insigniﬁcant for the ﬁfty-to-sixty group. Therefore, in targeting the thirty-
to-thirty-nine group, the high opportunity cost of hours spent to have
health checkups must be considered by policymakers, especially for health
checkups that take a full day. As mentioned earlier, the eﬀect of NHI is sig-
niﬁcantly negative for both the thirty-to-thirty-nine and forty-to-forty-
nine age groups and should be targeted in the promotion of health check-
ups. Similarly, those working in ﬁrms with four or fewer employees
(SIZE1) should also be targeted by policymakers.
The results by type of individual health insurance, shown in table 10.11,
reveal that males with ASOCHI, GOVTHI or MUTUHI—that is, those
who have 80 percent coverage of medical costs—are more likely to have
health checkups than are males with NHI (i.e., those with 70 percent cov-
erage). Thus, medical cost coverage also plays a signiﬁcant role in the
health checkup decision. One may also take the view that those with health
insurance other than NHI are more informed about health checkups and
consequently have more opportunities to have them. When an individual




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.is the breadwinner (BREADWIN) or the highest income earner in a house-
hold, he or she has a higher probability of having a health checkup, re-
gardless of the type of health insurance held. This may arise because of the
breadwinner’s heavy responsibilities to the household.
People with NHI tend to be self-employed, farmers, part-time workers,
professionals such as medical doctors and lawyers, who run their own
oﬃces, and the like. The estimates on the variables SIZE1000 to SIZE30
may be somewhat inconsistent in the NHI sample. It must be kept in mind,
however, that there are quite a number of people working in large ﬁrms on
a temporary basis. The statistically signiﬁcant estimated coeﬃcients for
the SIZE variables in this subsample may be explained by the fact that
workers in large ﬁrms have more opportunities to have checkups, regard-
less of their insurance coverage. In such cases, people with NHI are prob-
ably not using their health insurance to get checkups. Instead, most of the
health checkup costs are borne by the employers, who run on-site medical
oﬃces.  Thus, employees in large ﬁrms who are covered by NHI have
greater accessibility to medical facilities for health checkups compared to
those who are simply covered by NHI.
The estimated coeﬃcient on LIFEINSU for the entire sample, reported
in table 10.8, is signiﬁcantly negative. Table 10.11 reveals, however, that it
is signiﬁcantly positive under ASOCHI (health insurance managed by as-
sociations for employees working in relatively large ﬁrms) and MUTUHI
(Mutual aid associations for public employees and personnel in private
schools).
Finally, we examine the demand for health checkups by size of institu-
tion, as shown in table 10.12. The sign of each explanatory variable is
largely consistent across institution size, but the signiﬁcance varies widely.
On average, the results are more robust in institutions with ninety-nine or
fewer employees. This may be due to the fact that employees in relatively
small institutions have a greater ability to choose whether to have a health
checkup. In other words, small institutions may not be providing adequate
opportunities for their employees to obtain checkups, and they are not re-
quired to do so by law. Therefore, the health checkup decision is left largely
to the employee’s discretion.
10.5.3 Results for Patient Hospital Stays
The previous section focused on how individual characteristics aﬀect the
demand for health checkups. The regression results revealed that a large
number of socioeconomic and demographic variables are signiﬁcant in the
health checkup decision. Here, we extend this analysis to explain the prob-
ability of being a patient in a hospital and, if admitted, the length of hos-
pitalization. The dependent variables used in this section are PATIENT (a
dummy variable indicating hospitalization) and HOSPITAL (length of







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.hospitalization in months).26 The results shown in table 10.13 are from the
second stage of a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. There are
seven endogenous variables, from CHECKUP through CHEK1. For ex-
ample, the variable CHEK1000 is the product of CHECKUP and
SIZE1000.27 In the discussion that follows, we focus on the estimated co-
eﬃcients of these endogenous variables.
First, in the regressions using PATIENT as the dependent variable, the
estimated coeﬃcient on CHECKUP is highly signiﬁcant and negative 
(–9.014).28The product terms are all negative, with CHEK1000, CHEK500,
and CHEK5 being statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, having a health checkup
in an institution of one of these sizes reduces the probability of becoming
ill and being hospitalized. On the other hand, individuals in institutions
from SIZE1000 to SIZE30 who do not have a health checkup have a higher
probability of becoming ill. Therefore, if institutions want to reduce their
inpatient medical expenditures, they should encourage their employees to
have health checkups on a regular basis. However, because the provision of
health checkups does entail certain costs, the long-run cost-eﬀectiveness of
this policy is unknown.
Second, the eﬀect of health checkups on HOSPITAL (tobit) is similar to
that on PATIENT. CHECKUP is highly signiﬁcant, and the negative sign
indicates that individuals who have health checkups experience shorter
hospital stays. The estimated coeﬃcients on the product terms are all neg-
ative, and they are statistically signiﬁcant for CHEK1000, CHEK5, and
CHEK1. Combined with the positive estimated coeﬃcients on SIZE1000
to SIZE5, these results suggest that, conditional on hospitalization, in-
dividuals who do not have health checkups will probably have longer
hospital stays. To examine the robustness of the eﬀect of CHECKUP on
HOSPITAL, we estimate another HOSPITAL equation that takes into ac-
count the selection bias. The results obtained from the bias-corrected re-
gression, HOSPITAL (OLS robust), are qualitatively quite similar to those
obtained from HOSPITAL (tobit). The selectivity bias term (the estimated
coeﬃcient on the inverse Mills ratio variable) is –0.015 and highly statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. The negative sign of the selectivity bias term indicates that
individuals who have health checkups experience shorter lengths of hospi-
talization, on average, than those who do not.
The bottom of table 10.13 includes several additional statistics com-
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26. For brevity, we do not report summary statistics for the independent variables in table
10.13. However, the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values of PATIENT
are 0.005, 0.073, 0, and 1, respectively; for HOSPITAL, they are 3.088, 2.925, 0, and 12, re-
spectively. Patients with hospital stays longer than one year are excluded from the sample. In-
cluding all inpatients would mean including an observation with a value of 687 months. The
censored sample is more appropriate for this study.
27. The omitted variable under ﬁrm size is PUBEMPLY.
28. Since the endogenous variables are all predicted values from the ﬁrst stage of the probit



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.puted for these models. In the reduced form equation to estimate
CHECKUP,29 there are ﬁfty-two instruments in total, thirty-seven of
which (including the eleven regional dummies and the seven endogenous
variables) are included in the structural model of PATIENT. Therefore,
there are ﬁfteen predetermined variables that do not appear in the struc-
tural model; health-related variables such as SICKNUMB to HLTHFAIR
are excluded from the PATIENT model because their inclusion in the sec-
ond stage would make the estimation singular.30 The F-ratio (instrument)
for the ﬁfteen instruments under PATIENT is 1545.66 with d.f.   (15,
310081), which indicates that the instruments as a set are statistically sig-
niﬁcant.
Next, we test for the validity and relevance of the instruments. We
use two types of tests: the Basmann test (1960) and the Hausman test
(1983, 433). The regression results reported in table 10.13 pertain to em-
ployees working in establishments classiﬁed as SIZE1000 to SIZE1 or
PUBEMPLY, with a sample size of 156,352. The statistics are Basmann F-
ratio   641.72 (d.f.   8, 156300) and Hausman Chi-square   12669.05
(d.f.   8), both of which are statistically signiﬁcant.31 Hence, the ﬁfteen
omitted instruments are statistically valid in the ﬁrst-stage estimation of
health checkups.32
Finally, we test the exogeneity of the seven endogenous variables,
CHECKUP to CHEK1, and determine whether they belong in the struc-
tural PATIENT model.33 The Hausman F-ratio    2188.48 (d.f.   7,
156307) rejects the null hypothesis to exclude. The Hausman F-ratio  
243.53 (d.f.   7, 155949) is also statistically signiﬁcant for the HOSPITAL
model.
To summarize, health checkups (CHECKUP) play an important role in
both the PATIENT (the probability of being an inpatient) and HOSPITAL
(the length of stay in hospital) models. An individual who undergoes
health checkups has a much lower risk of being hospitalized than one who
does not. Furthermore, hospital stays are shorter for individuals who have
the checkups.
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29. The sample size is 310,134 in the ﬁrst stage, as shown for age thirty to sixty in table 10.8.
30. If the omitted variables are signiﬁcantly correlated with other independent variables,
there may be omitted variables bias. However, we are more concerned with the eﬀects of the
endogenous variables on the dependent variable PATIENT. By deﬁnition, the estimated val-
ues of endogenous variables are orthogonal to the residuals.
31. The degrees of freedom (8, 156300) for Basmann’s test is obtained using the following
formula: The numerator (i.e., 8) is the total number of excluded predetermined variables from
the second-stage estimation (the PATIENT equation), minus the number of endogenous vari-
ables (i.e., 15 – 7), and the denominator (i.e., 156300) is the total number of observations in
the second-stage estimation minus the total number of predetermined variables in the ﬁrst-
stage estimation (i.e., 156352 – 52).
32. The same processes are also applied to the estimation of the HOSPITAL equation in
table 10.13.
33. This procedure is explained in Gujarati (1995, 672–73).10.5.4 The Marginal Eﬀects of Health Checkups
on the PATIENT and HOSPITAL Models
The marginal eﬀects of a health checkup (CHECKUP) on PATIENT
and HOSPITAL are reported in table 10.14. The marginal eﬀect of a health
checkup on PATIENT is –0.084, whereas that on HOSPITAL is –0.048.
The –0.084 value indicates that a 10 percentage point increase in the
prevalence of health checkups (CHECKUP) will decrease the probability
of hospitalization by 0.84 percentage points. This eﬀect is averaged over all
individuals aged thirty to sixty. In addition to this basic eﬀect, if the indi-
vidual is an employee in a ﬁrm of SIZE1000, SIZE500, or SIZE5, there is
an additional reduction in the probability of hospitalization of 0.1 to 0.2
percentage points for a ten-percentage point change in CHECKUP.34 In
other words, the probability of hospitalization is 1 percent lower for an in-
dividual who has had a health checkup.35 At ﬁrst glance, this may appear
to be a negligible value, but from the standpoint of a typical ﬁrm, one out
of every 100 employees may avoid hospitalization.
The marginal eﬀect of health checkups (CHECKUP) on HOSPITAL is
–0.048. This implies a reduction in hospitalization of about 0.15 months
for an individual aged thirty to sixty who stayed in the hospital less than
one year.36 The coeﬃcients on the product terms, CHEK1000 through
CHEK1, are all negative. The marginal eﬀects of CHEK1000, CHEK5,
and CHEK1 are statistically signiﬁcant (see table 10.13). For example, the
–0.011 on CHEK1000 is equivalent to a reduction in the length of hospital
stay of about 0.03 months (0.011   3.1 months), or about one day.
The Demand for Health Checkups under Uncertainty 309
Table 10.14 Marginal Eﬀects of Health Checkups on Patient Status (Probit) and
Hospital Status (Tobit)








Note: Results are from table 10.13.
34. The estimated coeﬃcients of CHECK1000, CHECK500, and CHECK5 are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, as shown in table 10.13.
35. Here, the interpretation is in terms of percents rather than percentage points because
the original value of CHECKUP in the reduced-form equation is either 1 or 0.
36. The average length of hospital stay is about 3.1 months for persons aged thirty to sixty
who stayed in the hospital less than one year. The 0.15 month ﬁgure (4.5 days per month) is
obtained by multiplying 0.048 by 3.1.These reductions are substantial in light of hospital costs, opportunity
costs, and psychological costs. Consider employed survey respondents
who were hospitalized in May 1995 as an example. The average monthly
out-of-pocket cost for individuals aged thirty to sixty is about $420 ($1  
100 yen). Average monthly out-of-pocket cost for individuals aged thirty to
sixty is approximately $1,100.37 Since these individuals are employees in
ﬁrms, they must be covered by health insurance managed by associations
or health insurance managed by the government. Thus, the costs paid by
the individuals reﬂect only 20 percent of total hospital costs. The other 80
percent is borne by the Social Insurance Medical Care Fee Payment Fund.
Therefore, total hospital costs must be about $2,100 per month or $5,500
per month for thirty- to ﬁfty-year-olds and thirty- to sixty-year-olds, re-
spectively.
The reduction in the length of hospital stay due to health checkups
translates into a reduction in hospital costs. On an individual basis, the re-
duction in hospitalization by 0.15 months, or 0.18 (  0.15   0.03) months
when ﬁrm size is taken into account, reduces hospital expenditures by $315
($2,100   0.15) per case for a hospitalized individual aged thirty to ﬁfty
and $825 ($5,500   0.15) per case for a hospitalized individual aged thirty
to sixty. About $70 to $190 may be added to these ﬁgures if the eﬀect of the
product term of health checkup and ﬁrm size, CHEK1000, is taken into
consideration.38
In comparison to these costs, a thorough, in-hospital medical examina-
tion (i.e., a health checkup) costs only $365 (see section 10.2). Further-
more, an individual’s out-of-pocket expenses for additional tests are mini-
mal due to local government subsidies. These ﬁgures suggest that health
checkups are highly cost-eﬀective in the long run. Therefore, health check-
ups should be widely encouraged as a method of illness prevention.
10.6 Summary and Conclusion
This study investigates the demand for health checkups among the
working population in Japan. According to the 1995 National Survey of
Life (Statistics and Information 1998), the health checkup rate of the
twenty- to sixty-four-year-old population is about 56 percent. The analysis
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37. The averages are from costs paid by individuals who were hospitalized during the
month of May 1995. In terms of Japanese yen, the values are about 41,600 yen for individu-
als aged thirty to ﬁfty and about 111,200 yen for those aged thirty to sixty.
38. The marginal eﬀect of the product term of health checkup and ﬁrm size, CHEK1000,
is –0.011. Therefore, savings can be calculated as $72   (0.011   3.1 months   $2,100 per
month) for thirty- to ﬁfty-year-olds, and $188   (0.011   3.1 months   $5,500 per month)
for thirty- to sixty-year-olds. Patients with hospital stays longer than one year are excluded
from the sample. Inclusion of all inpatients would mean including an observation with a value
of 687 months. The censored sample is more appropriate for this study.focuses on the thirty-to-sixty age group for two reasons: ﬁrst, this age
group is more homogeneous than the twenty-to-sixty-four age group;
second, sixty is generally the retirement age for employees in Japan. The
empirical results have direct policy implications for the prevention of ill-
ness among the working population. These results pinpoint speciﬁc poli-
cies that ﬁrms can implement to improve employee health and help con-
tain growing medical expenditures.
The individual’s health checkup decision is explored using a probit
model, which is estimated separately by age group, gender, type of health
insurance, and ﬁrm size. The major explanatory variables of interest in-
clude age, gender, wage rate, health insurance coverage, aﬃliated ﬁrm size,
and objective evaluations of the individual’s health condition. We also ex-
amine the eﬀects of an individual’s health checkup status on his or her
probability of hospitalization and the subsequent length of hospital stay.
Most of the estimated coeﬃcients of the aforementioned variables have
the theoretically predicted signs and are highly signiﬁcant determinants of
the demand for health checkups. The estimated coeﬃcients on age and age-
squared are positive and negative, respectively, reﬂecting that the incentive
to have a health checkup increases at a diminishing rate with stock of
health. Because stock of health increases with age, as does earning ability,
the incentives for having a health checkup also increase. Gender also plays
an important role in the individual’s decision to have a health checkup.
Due to genetic and biological diﬀerences, males are more likely to have
health checkups than females.
A health checkup is a time-consuming health input. For this reason, the
opportunity cost of work hours or days is a major determinant of the
health checkup decision. The sign of the individual’s wage rate is negative
and highly signiﬁcant in the probit models, and the magnitude is largest for
the thirty-to-thirty-nine age group. Given the negative eﬀect of NHI on
health checkup rates, the positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects of health insur-
ance managed by associations, health insurance managed by the govern-
ment, and mutual aid associations insurance reveal that individuals are
more willing to have checkups when coverage is more generous. Further-
more, larger enterprises do more to encourage their employees to get
health checkups than do smaller enterprises. Thus, in order to promote
health checkups among employees and consequently in the population as
a whole, a public policy that lowers the opportunity cost of health check-
ups for targeted groups of working people is desirable.
The estimated coeﬃcients on the individual’s objective health conditions
are statistically robust. The more illness (and stress) an individual faces,
the more likely he is to have a health checkup. On the other hand, if an in-
dividual has not visited clinics or hospitals for the past year, which we take
to reﬂect a higher stock of health, he is less likely to have a health checkup,
The Demand for Health Checkups under Uncertainty 311ceteris paribus. Therefore, promoting individuals’ health stock, by provid-
ing better working conditions and reducing work stress, for instance, may
help to contain the increase in medical expenditures.
In the short run, health checkups increase medical expenditures. These
expenditures are oﬀset, however, by reductions in the incidence and dura-
tion of hospitalization. Using 2SLS on the sample data, we ﬁnd a signiﬁ-
cantly negative and robust health checkup eﬀect on these measures. In
other words, an individual who has had a health checkup has a much lower
risk of being hospitalized than one who has not. Furthermore, if this indi-
vidual is hospitalized, he is likely to have a shorter hospital stay. Thus, in
the long run, checkups will reduce not only monetary expenditures but
also psychological burdens associated with illness and hospitalization.
The point estimate of the eﬀect of health checkups on the probability of
hospitalization suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in the health
checkup rate will reduce the probability of hospitalization by 0.8 percent-
age points. This is the base eﬀect of an individual health checkup; the eﬀect
varies by ﬁrm size, and one important ﬁnding is that checkups may prevent
hospitalization for one out of every 100 employees in large ﬁrms.
As for length of hospital stay, a 1 percentage point increase in the health
checkup rate reduces stays by 0.15 months per year for the thirty-to-sixty
age group. Adding in the eﬀects associated with ﬁrm size reduces the aver-
age stay by an additional 0.03 months. Without the ﬁrm-size eﬀects, these
reductions translate into cost savings of $315 for individuals aged thirty to
ﬁfty and $825 for individuals aged thirty to sixty. The ﬁrm-size eﬀects re-
duce costs further by $70 to $190 per month. These approximate monetary
calculations are based solely on hospital costs paid by both the individual
and the health insurance agency. If psychological and opportunity costs
were incorporated into this analysis, total beneﬁts would far surpass mon-
etary savings.
To conclude, this paper ﬁnds that health checkups constitute a highly
cost-eﬀective means of illness prevention within the context of the current
comprehensive system of national health care. We must increase the rela-
tively low health checkup rate of 56 percent in the twenty-to-sixty-four-
year-old population, if only because good health is, by itself, of great value.
Appendix
{[1    (A)]Uxx   (A)Uyy[1    ∗
hL(A, H)])   0.
From the ﬁrst-order optimal condition of equation (11), we have
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312 Tadashi Yamada and Tetsuji YamadaSince the right-side of the above equation shows the slope of the indiﬀer-
ence curve (Ehrlich and Becker 1972, 626), we can express this as follows:



















By partially diﬀerentiating the optimal condition with respect to P, the re-
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  [1    (A)]Ux (A)Uyy}   0,
which implies













x   (A)Uyy    0.
This is also expressed as
{[1    (A)]Uxx   [1    ∗
hL(A, H)] (A)Uyy}   0.
Thus, we obtain
{[1    (A)]Uxx    (A)Uyy[1    ∗
hL(A, H)]}   0.
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